Trade Union Rights in the Workers\u27 State: Poland and the ILO by Wirth, David A.
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 13 
Number 2 Winter Article 8 
May 2020 
Trade Union Rights in the Workers' State: Poland and the ILO 
David A. Wirth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
David A. Wirth, Trade Union Rights in the Workers' State: Poland and the ILO, 13 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 269 
(1984). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital 
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-
commons@du.edu. 
Trade Union Rights in the Workers' State:
Poland and the ILO
DAVID A. WIRTH*
I. INTRODUCTION**
Poland recently gave notice of its intent to withdraw from the Inter-
national Labor Organization ("ILO") as a result of the ILO's treatment of
the Polish trade union situation.' The Polish government had previously
warned of this action by characterizing the ILO's establishment of a Com-
mission of Inquiry to investigate alleged violations of trade union rights
in Poland as "[i]nterference in Poland's internal affairs" and "an artifi-
cial, politically motivated resolve to keep by every means the so-called
Polish case on ILO's agenda."' One implication of this statement is that
the Organization has attempted to hold Poland-a state in which "[t]he
working people . . .wield state authority" 3-to standards inconsistent
with the theoretical equivalence of the workers' and the state's interests.
Although the Commission's report' rejected these arguments, Poland's as-
sertions continue to have significance for the overall work of the ILO. A
particularly important question in this context is whether the existence of
trade unions free of state and Communist Party influence is consistent
* Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State. The views presented
in this article are those of the author and do not represent positions of the Department of
State. The author would like to acknowledge Professor Leon S. Lipson, who suggested the
subject of this article.
** Due to publication delays, the editors regret that diacritical marks have been deleted
from the text and footnotes. Complete copies of various sources are available by contacting
the Journal office.
1. Letter from Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski, Permanent Representative of the Po-
lish People's Republic to the United Nations Office in Geneva, to Francis Blanchard, Direc-
tor-General of the ILO (Nov. 17, 1984). The withdrawal will not take effect for two years
and does not alter the obligations undertaken by Poland pursuant to ILO conventions. ILO
CONsT. art. 1, para. 5. The Belorussian SSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, Mongolia, the Ukranian SSR, and the USSR have formally sup-
ported Poland's action. Letter to Francis Blanchard, Director-General of the ILO (Nov. 23,
1984).
2. Letter from Stanislaw Turbanski, Permanent Representative of the Polish People's
Republic in Geneva, to Francis Blanchard, Director-General of the ILO (June 24, 1983),
reprinted in 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. Annex 1 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report
on Poland).
3. KONSTrrUCJA (Constitution) art. 2, para. 1 (Pol.). Cf. KoNsTrruTrsIA (Constitution)
art. 1 (USSR) (The state "express[es] the will and interests of the workers.")
4. 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report on Poland).
See infra text accompanying notes 66 & 68.
5. The Communist Party does not have a formal role in the government or the state,
but is "the guiding political force of society in building socialism." KONSTYTUCJA (Constitu-
tion) art. 3, para. 1 (Pol.). Cf. KoNsTrrrrTsiA (Constitution) art. 6 (USSR) (The Communist
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with the fundamental political principles on which a workers' state such
as Poland is based.'
II. TRADE UNION THEORY AND PRACTICE IN POLAND
Lenin's statements about the role of trade unions in the postrevolu-
tionary workers' state were ambiguous. Lenin rejected the proposition
that the state should assert total control over the unions as well as the
thesis that the unions should be completely autonomous. Instead he
adopted a compromise view that identified the unions primarily as links
between the state and the masses. The unions were not to be instruments
of the state, although their goals would be consistent with those of the
state and the Party. Likewise the unions would act as a vehicle for resolv-
ing workers' grievances, although they would also participate in supervis-
ing production norms and enforcing labor discipline.'
In practice the behavior of the official trade unions in Poland and
other Soviet bloc states has been remote from this intermediate doctrinal
position. The tension inherent in the unions' dual role is usually resolved
in favor of the concerns of the state and the Party. The unions' function
of transmitting directives to workers from the state and the Party has
Party is "[t]he leading and guiding force of Soviet society.") Conceptual distinctions be-
tween the Party and the state, however, are often unproductive, as the Party's influence
permeates virtually all governmental organs. See, e.g., W. BRUS, SOCIALIST OWNERSHIP AND
POLITICAL SYSTEMS 51-57 (1975) (etatist model of Party). See also de Weydenthal, Workers
and Party in Poland, PROBS. COMMUNISM, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 1, 16 ("[T]he Polish sociopolit-
ical environment has long been characterized by the party's dominance over all aspects of
organized social activity, especially by the official insistence that no form of public activity
can develop independently of the party's direct control and supervision.")
6. For a discussion of events leading to the establishment of independent trade unions
in Poland, see generally N. ASCHERSON, THE POLISH AUGUST (1982); R. ERINGER, STRIKE FOR
FREEDOM! (1982); D. MACSHANE, SOLIDARITY (1981); A. TOURAINE, F. DUBET, M. WIEVIORKA
& J. STRZELECKI, SOLIDARITY (1983) [hereinafter cited as TOURAINE, ET AL.]; L. WESCHLER,
SOLIDARITY (1982).
7. See S. COHEN, BUKHARIN AND THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 102-03 (1974); M. FAINSOD,
How RUSSIA Is RULED 143 (rev. ed. 1963). Lenin's view was founded primarily on Marx's
conception of trade unions as "schools of communism." See S. COHEN, supra, at 102; F.
KAPLAN, BOLSHEVIK IDEOLOGY AND THE ETHICS OF SOVIET LABOR 295 (1968); A. LOZOVSKY,
MARX AND THE TRADE UNIONS 175 (1942). See generally Lenin, The Trade Unions, the Pre-
sent Situation and Trotsky's Mistakes, in ON TRADE UNIONS 375, 376-77 (B. Koval ed.
o .. +l .. ~ , ro,}o nl(~ €tKNeWPI Constitution) art. 85
1970)1 (specch delivered on December 30, 1920)- (-f. KONa-v'rI1rIA (osiuin r.8
(Pol.) ("Trade unions . . . shall be the school of civic activeness and involvement in the
building of socialist society.") Lenin had previously adhered to Trotsky's position requiring
total "statification" of the unions, but underwent an ideological shift in 1920. See S. COHEN,
supra, at 102; J. SORENSON, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF SOVIET TRADE UNIONISM 85-86 (1969).
Lenin's ultimate position can be seen as a practical compromise intended to resolve the
conflict between the unions and the state. See L. SCHAPIRO, THE ORIGIN OF THE COMMUNIST
AUTOCRACY 283 (2d ed. 1977); J. SORENSON, supra, at 85-86. See also N. ASCHERSON, supra
note 6, at 248 (Lenin's statements on trade unions were "responses to crises.") Although he
viewed trade unions as focal points for the political organization of the working class in
capitalist countries, Marx provided little guidance on the role of trade unions in the post-
revolutionary state. See A. LoZOVSKY, supra, at 16-25, 174-75.
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consequently expanded at the expense of activities directed toward the
defense of workers' interests. As a result, the official Polish trade unions
have supported wage reductions, longer working hours, and productivity
increases.8 As a matter of principle, however, the bloc states have adopted
a contradictory position by committing themselves, as discussed in the
following section, to certain international standards established by the
ILO.9
III. POLAND AND THE ILO
The ILO was founded for the improvement of conditions of labor,' ° a
8. See N. ASCHERSON, supra note 6, at 249; A. KARATNYCKY, A. MOTvL & A. STURMTHAL,
WORKERS' RIGHTS, EAST AND WEST 69-71 (1980) [hereinafter cited as KARATNYCKY, ET AL.];
Stefanowsky & Hudson, Two Conflicting Concepts of Unions in Poland, in AUGUST 1980:
THE STRIKES IN POLAND 62 (W. Robinson ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as AUGUST 1980]. See
also J. DE WEYDENTHAL, THE COMMUNISTS OF POLAND 62 (1978); M. DZIEWANOWSKI, THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND 201 (2d ed. 1976); R. LESLIE, A. POLONSKY, J. CIECHANOWSKI &
Z. PELCZYNSKI, THE HISTORY OP POLAND SINCE 1863, at 301 (1980); P. WANDYCZ, THE UNITED
STATES AND POLAND 344 (1980). Cf. M. FAINSOD, supra note 7, at 518-22 (trade union prac-
tice in USSR); KARATNYCKY, ET AL., supra, at 53-64, 78-93 (trade union practice in USSR,
Rumania, and Czechoslovakia). Strikes are not prohibited by legislation in Poland and other
bloc states, but are theoretically impossible because the state's and the workers' interests
supposedly coincide. See C. JENKS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION FREE-
DOM 368 (1957). Termination without notice, however, is authorized in Poland for "a serious
violation of... basic obligations as a worker and, more particularly, ... [for] absen[ce] from
... work without a valid reason." LAB. CODE § 52(1)(1) (1974)(Pol.), translated in 1974 ILO
LEGIS. SER. This provision has been used to punish striking workers. See KARATNYCKY, ET
AL., supra, at 71-73. See also LAB. CODE §§ 64 & 65 (1974) (Pol.) (providing for cancellation
of contract of employment for absence from workplace).
9. Various provisions of Polish domestic legislation in principle protect trade union
rights. The Polish constitution provides that "[t]rade unions shall play an important part in
the Polish People's Republic ... [and] shall represent the interests and rights of the work-
ing people." KONSTYTUCJA (Constitution) art. 85 (Pol.). The constitution also provides that
"trade unions ... shall unite citizens for their active participation in political, social, eco-
nomic, and cultural life." Id. art. 84, para. 2. See also id. art. 83, para. 1 & art. 84, para. 1
(guaranteeing freedom of meetings and assembly and right of association). Article 1, para-
graph 1 of the Trade Union Act of 1982 states that "[w]orkers shall have the right to estab-
lish and associate together in trade unions." 1982 Dziennik Ustaw 581 (Pol.), translated in
1982 ILO LEGIS. SER. The Act also provides that "[t]rade unions represent occupational
interests of their members." Id. art. 5. In addition, "[tirade unions represent and defend the
workers' rights and interests in connection with working conditions, wages, social and living
conditions and welfare." Id. art. 6, para. 1. The Polish labor code specifies that "[w]orkers
shall have the right to associate in trade unions." LAB. CODE § 19(1) (1974) (Pol.), translated
in 1974 ILO LEGIS. SER. But see id. § 19(2) (Trade unions "shall . .. co-operate with the
competent organs of government in issuing and applying the provisions of labour law and
shall take action to reinforce the rule of law in connection with the observance of the work-
ers' rights and obligations.")
10. See ILO CONST. preamble para. 2 & annex art. III. The ILO is now a specialized
agency of the United Nations. See Protocol Concerning the Entry into Force of the Agree-
ment Between the United Nations and the International Labour Organization, Dec. 19,
1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 183, 29 Off. Bull. 383 (1946). All UN members are eligible to become ILO
members. ILO CONST. art. 1, para. 3. This accounts for the presence in the ILO of the
Belorussian and Ukranian SSRs, both of which are UN members. See supra note 1 & infra
1984
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mandate which is furthered through the adoption of conventions" and
recommendations.' 2 The annual International Labor Conference 3 is the
plenary body of the Organization and the Governing Body 4 its executive
council. The International Labor Office,' 5 headed by the Director-Gen-
eral, is the Organization's secretariat. The most distinctive feature of the
ILO's institutional structure is the principle of tripartism, under which
not only government officials, but also representatives of workers and em-
ployers, are participating delegates to the Conference and the Governing
Body."
notes 16, 21 & 22.
11. Only ratification by a member state creates binding obligations under a convention.
ILO CONST. art. 20. But see infra text accompanying note 43 (freedom of association princi-
ples apply to member states regardless of ratification of Nos. 87 and 98).
12. Recommendations are guidelines for-national action. See N. VALTICOS, INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOUR LAW 44 (1979); Landy, The Implementation Procedures of the International
Labor Organization, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 633, 634 (1980).
13. See ILO CONST. arts. 3 & 4. See generally G. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LA-
BOUR ORGANISATION 25-46 (1970); N. VALTicos, supra note 12, at 34-36.
14. See ILO CONST. art. 7. See generally G. JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 47-53; N.
VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 36-37.
15. See ILO CONST. arts. 8-10. See generally G. JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 54-63; N.
VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 37-38.
16. At the Conference each member state is entitled to two government delegates and
one delegate each representing workers and employers. ILO CONST. art. 3, para. 1. Each
delegate to the Conference has one vote. Id. art. 4, para. 1. The Governing Body has the
same 2:1:1 ratio of representation. Id. art. 7, para. 1. See generally W. GALENSON, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 11 (1981) ("[I]t is not at all unusual, especially among
democratic countries, for delegates from one nation to vote differently on various issues.");
N. VATICOS, supra note 12, at 29. When the Soviet Union first joined the ILO in 1934, a
long conflict between the principles of tripartism and universal membership began. See gen-
erally A. ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 290-317 (1971); W.
GALENSON, supra, at 35-47; G. JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 16-17 (principle of universality).
There were numerous objections to the participation of Soviet workers' and employers' dele-
gates on the ground that they represented institutions and interests that were not distinct
from those of the state. See A. ALCOCK, supra, at 131-33. See generally N. VALTICOS, supra
note 12, at 32-34 (summarizing problems with credentials of nongovernmental delegates
from bloc states). Cf. infra note 60 (criteria for selection of nongovernmental delegates).
Dispute over the role of workers' and employers' delegates to the ILO from Soviet bloc
states continues to the present. See, e.g., Letter from Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
of the United States, to Francis Blanchard, Director-General of the ILO (Nov. 5, 1975),
U.N. Doc. A/C.5/1704 Annex (1975), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1582 (1975)
(letter transmit.g ..,.-t of Ut-et-at.. to _-ithaw .ru IL., ciLing erosion of tripar-
tite representation). The bloc states for their part have complained of a capitalist bias in the
ILO. At the time of the Organization's founding, the USSR denounced it as "a capitalist
device to oppress working people." W. GALENSON, supra, at 4. See also A. ALCOCK, supra, at
128 (Soviet criticisms of ILO); V. SHKUNAEV, MEZHDUNARODNAIA ORGANIZATSIIA TRUDA
VCHERA I SEGODNIA 7-17 (1968) (ILO founded by ruling classes as instrument of reform
designed to subdue class struggle); V. VLADIMIROV, MEZHDUNARODNAIA ORGANIZATSIIA TRUDA
10-11 (1959) (same); Letter to Francis Blanchard, Director-General of the ILO (Mar. 29,
1985), ILO Doc. GB.230/19/4 Appendix I (declaration of Bulgaria, Belorussian SSR, Czecho-
slovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Ukranian SSR, and USSR as-
serting that "the ILO in effect serves the interests of only one socio-political system, that of
capitalism, in an attempt to impose its will and ways on other States"). The bloc has also
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A. The ILO Freedom of Association Conventions
Conventions Nos. 87'" and 98 '8 ("freedom of association conven-
tions") are among the principal human rights instruments of the ILO. No.
87, "the basic instrument for the international protection of freedom of
association,"" provides that workers and employers, without distinction,
shall have the right to establish and join organizations of their own choos-
ing without previous authorization. These organizations are to have the
rights, free from interference by public authorities, to draw up constitu-
tions and rules, to elect representatives freely, and to direct their activi-
ties. Workers' and employers' organizations are not to be dissolved by
administrative authority. The acquisition of legal personality by workers'
and employers' organizations is not to be made subject to conditions that
would restrict these rights. Workers' and employers' organizations are to
have the right to establish and join federations and confederations, which
in turn may affiliate with international organizations of workers and
employers.
No. 98 elaborates No. 87's guarantees with special concern for work-
ers and workers' organizations. Workers are to enjoy adequate protection
against acts of antiunion discrimination, which include conditions that a
worker not join a union and dismissal by reason of union membership.
Workers' organizations are protected from interference by employers and
from acts designed to subject workers' organizations to the domination of
employers. Procedures for guaranteeing these rights are to be
established.2 0
Each of the Soviet bloc states has ratified Nos. 87 and 98.2' Although
the Soviet Union was not an active member of the ILO when Nos. 87 and
complained of socialist underrepresentation in the ILO. See, e.g., V. SHKUNAEV, supra, at
155-79 (bloc states' efforts to increase socialist representation in ILO organs); Letter to
Francis Blanchard, supra. Among nongovernmental delegates from bloc states, only work-
ers' delegates have ever been elected to the Governing Body. Even that has been an infre-
quent occurrence. See W. GALENSON, supra, at 96.
17. Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize, adopted July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17, 31 Rec. Proc. 547 (1948).
18. Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to
Organise and to Bargain Collectively, adopted July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257, 32 Rec. Proc.
850 (1949).
19. N. VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 81.
20. Neither convention mentions the right to strike. Fundamental principles of freedom
of association, however, have been construed to protect the right to strike under many cir-
cumstances and to prohibit, in particular, an absolute prohibition on strikes. See N. VAL-
Ticos, supra note 12, at 85-86. See generally INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FREEDOM OF
AssOCIATION 109-30 (2d ed. 1976) (digest of Committee on Freedom of Association
decisions).
21. 253 U.N.T.S. 387, 394 (Belorussian SSR); 337 U.N.T.S. 392, 405 (Bulgaria); 131
U.N.T.S. 344, 134 U.N.T.S. 378 (Cuba); 488 U.N.T.S. 363, 365 (Czechoslovakia); 972
U.N.T.S. 425 (German Democratic Republic); 272 U.N.T.S. 254, 258 (Hungary); 682
U.N.T.S. 328, 332 (Mongolia); 264 U.N.T.S. 332, 348 (Poland); 272 U.N.T.S. 254, 318
U.N.T.S. 420 (Rumania); 253 U.N.T.S. 387, 394 (Ukranian SSR); 249 U.N.T.S. 453, 459
(USSR).
1984
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98 were adopted,2 2 the USSR was a principal contributor to the initiative
which led to the two conventions.2 s Both at the time the conventions were
drafted24 and later,2 the Soviet Union objected that they were insuffi-
cient, in part because they did not guarantee the right to strike. The Po-
lish government delegation abstained from voting for No. 87 because the
text was inadequate to protect trade union rights.2s A Czechoslovak gov-
ernment delegate 7 and Polish and Czechoslovak workers' delegates28
even proposed an amendment to the draft of No. 98 that would have
codified the right to strike.
B. Supervision Under the Freedom of Association Conventions
The ILO not only adopts conventions, but also employs measures to
encourage and monitor implementation of ratified conventions by mem-
ber states. There are two paths by which the ILO may facilitate adher-
ence to the principles contained in Nos. 87 and 98: so-called "ordinary
supervision," applicable to any ratified convention; and specialized adju-
dicatory procedures applicable only to the freedom of association conven-
tions. Results of proceedings commenced through both routes demon-
strate that Poland has persistently failed to uphold the trade union rights
it voluntarily undertook to protect.
1. Ordinary Supervision
Ordinary reporting and supervisory procedures come into effect upon
ratification of a convention. Member states must prepare reports on pro-
gress in the implementation of ratified conventions.2" These reports are
22. When the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations in 1939, its status in the
ILO became unclear. See A. ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 157-58; V. SHKUNAEV, supra note 16,
at 135-36. The USSR, along with the Belorussian and Ukranian SSRs, formally rejoined in
1954. 200 U.N.T.S. 338. Poland has been an ILO member continuously since the Organiza-
tion's founding.
23. See, e.g., V. VLADIMmOV, supra note 16, at 62-63. See generally A. ALCOCK, supra
note 16, at 252-54 (Soviet initiative on trade union rights, undertaken through World Feder-
ation of Trade Unions, diverted from UN to ILO by American Federation of Labor); S.
IVANOV, MEZHDUNARODNAIA ORGANIZATSIIA TRUDA I PROFSOIUZNYE PRAVA V KAPrrALISTICHES-
KIKH STRANAKH 16-27 (1959) (same).
24. See U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.111, at 14 (1949) (Soviet criticisms of Nos. 87 and 98).
See generally A. ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 254-60 (drafting history of Nos. 87 and 98); S.
IVANOV, supra note 23, at 27-49 (same).
-- fO i 10 Ct101-U ken I " IL -25. See S. IVANov, supru note 23, at 45, 1084-o, .- We" ILU...... ,_
failure to address right to strike, No. 87 for not prohibiting dissolution of trade unions by
judicial authority, and No. 98 for excluding civil servants); V. SHKUNAEV, supra note 16, at
91-93 (objecting to the inclusion of protections for employers in both conventions and criti-
cizing No. 87 for failure to treat dissolution by legislative or judicial authority and No. 98
for excluding civil servants and not addressing right to strike); V. VLADImIROV, supra note
16, at 63-64 (objecting to the inclusion of protections for employers in both conventions and
suggesting that No. 98 might even be used to justify actions against striking workers).
26. 31 Rec. Proc. 233 (1948).
27. 32 Rec. Proc. 470 (1949).
28. 32 Rec. Proc. 468 (1949).
29. ILO CONST. art. 22. Article 22 specifies annual reports. There are, however, over
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transmitted to the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conven-
tions and Recommendations ("COE"),30 whose members are appointed in
their individual capacities by the Governing Body on the recommenda-
tion of the Director-General. The COE bases its report on information
supplied by governments and on other evidence, including comments
from workers' and employers' organizations. The COE's report goes to the
tripartite Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations ("CACR").3 ' The CACR produces its own report,
which includes special mention of particular cases, for discussion in the
plenary.
The COE has noted Poland's failure to implement the freedom of
association conventions in the vast majority of its annual reports since
Nos. 87 and 98 entered into force for that state."2 In its first report on
Poland in 1959, the COE made observations about the trade union situa-
tion that became typical of its later comments. The Committee noted
that the Trade Union Act of 194911 required registration with a Central
Council of Trade Unions, which had the power to impose conditions on
the grant of legal personality to an applicant organization. The COE
5000 ratifications of ILO conventions. See ILO Press Release (Aug. 11, 1982). Because of the
workload, detailed reports are now required only every two years in the case of the freedom
of association conventions. See W. GALENSON, supra note 16, at 203; Landy, supra note 12,
at 638.
30. See generally E. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION 19-34
(1966); N. VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 240-42; Landy, supra note 12, at 643-45. The COE
has enjoyed a reputation for impartiality and independence for many years, partly because
members are appointed in their individual capacities. See W. GALENSON, supra note 16, at
203-04; Landy, supra note 12, at 641-42. But see infra note 32 (bloc states question COE's
objectivity). The COE's report includes "observations" in the most important cases of
nonimplementation. The COE also communicates "direct requests" to governments in antic-
ipation of its next report. See N. VALTicos, supra note 12, at 241; Landy, supra note 12, at
643.
31. See STAND. ORD. INT'L LAB. CONF. art. 7. See generally W. GALENSON, supra note 16,
at 205-06; E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE 252-58 (1964); E. LANDY, supra note 30, at
36-51; N. VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 242; Landy, supra note 12, at 643-45.
32. 1985 COE Rep. 182-84, 236 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1983 COE Rep. 147-48, 181 (Nos. 87 &
98); 1982 COE Rep. 125-26 (No. 87); 1981 COE Rep. 121 (No. 87); 1979 COE Rep. 140-41
(No. 87); 1977 COE Rep. 161 (No. 87); 1975 COE Rep. 113-14 (No. 87); 1973 COE Rep. 127-
28 (No. 87); 1972 COE Rep. 161, 187 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1971 COE Rep. 129, 146 (Nos. 87 &
98); 1970 COE Rep. 121 (No. 87); 1969 COE Rep. 92, 105 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1968 COE Rep. 94
(No. 87); 1967 COE Rep. 90, 102 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1966 COE Rep. 101 (No. 87); 1965 COE
Rep. 98, 109) Nos. 87 & 98); 1964 COE Rep. 131, 149 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1963 COE Rep. 99-100,
112 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1962 COE Rep. 96-99, 128 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1961 COE Rep. 75-77 (No.
87); 1960 COE Rep. 44-46 (No. 87); 1959 COE Rep. 49 (No. 87). See infra note 47 (Nos. 87
and 98 entered into force for Poland in 1958). Poland and the other bloc states have ques-
tioned the validity of the approach taken by the COE in evaluating their implementation of
the freedom of association conventions. See, e.g., 1977 COE Rep. 134-35 (dissenting remarks
of Polish and Soviet COE members); 1963 COE Rep. 85 (COE response to criticisms from
Polish and Soviet COE members). See generally 71 Rec. Proc. 38/7 (1985) (Soviet govern-
ment adviser's questioning of status of COE under ILO Constitution); E. LANDY, supra note
30, at 193-96.
33. 1949 Dziennik Ustaw 853 (Pol.), translated in 1949 ILO LEGIS. SEa.
1984
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characterized these provisions as a legislative mandate for a monopolistic
trade union movement. The Committee then observed that this statutory
scheme was inconsistent with No. 87's provisions guaranteeing workers
the right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing without
previous authorization and assuring workers' organizations the right to
direct their own activities. In its next report, the Committee more force-
fully characterized the Central Council's requirements for registration as
government regulations and concluded that the legislative framework as a
whole constituted impermissible interference by the state in protected
trade union activity.3 The CACR has also publicized Poland's violations
of trade union rights. The CACR included Poland in a "special para-
graph" in its 1982 report to draw attention to the inconsistencies between
No. 87 and the declaration of martial law in December 1981.35
The ILO's Constitution provides another procedure for evaluation of
the adequacy of implementation of obligations assumed pursuant to a
convention. Under article 26 a member state may file a complaint against
another member alleging nonobservance of a convention both have rati-
fied. The Governing Body may also initiate a complaint on its own mo-
tion or upon the request of a delegate to the Conference. The Constitu-
tion provides for subsequent consideration of complaints in appropriate
cases by a Commission of Inquiry established by the Governing Body.3 e
Until 1983 only five full-scale Commissions of Inquiry had been es-
tablished in the ILO's history.3 7 The Governing Body constituted the
sixth as a result of an article 26 proceeding initiated against Poland under
Nos. 87 and 98 by the French and Norwegian workers' delegates to the
1982 Conference.3 8 The Polish government became the first in the history
34. Cf. S. IVANOV, supra note 23, at 100-06 (distinguishing requirements for registration
with governmental authorities from requirements for registration with trade union organs).
35. 68 Rec. Proc. 31/11 (1982) (noting that "the general suspension of trade union ac-
tivities" as a result of the declaration of martial law "constituted a serious infringement of
the principles of Convention No. 87"). See infra text accompanying notes 58-60. As a result
of Poland's inclusion in a special paragraph, the CACR's report was not adopted in Confer-
ence's plenary session. 68 Rec. Proc. 36/1 (1982). This was only the third time the Confer-
ence failed to adopt the CACR's report. See W. GALENSON, supra note 16, at 206; Landy,
supra note 12, at 644 n.26.
36. ILO CONST. arts. 26-29. Complaints may ultimately be referred to the International
Court of Justice. ILO CONST. arts. 29, 31-34. A similar type of adjudicatory procedure, a
"representation," may be initiated by workers' or employers' organizations. ILO CoNsT. arts.
24-25. Representations are considered first by a three-member committee of the Governing
Body and then by the Governing Body as a whole. See N. VALTrcos, supra note 12, at 248;
Landy, supra note 12, at 640.
37. See 66 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. (1983) (Commission of Inquiry report on Do-
minican Republic and Haiti); ILO Doc. GB.196/4/10 (1975) (Commission of Inquiry report
on Chile); 54 Off. Bull., No. 2, Spec. Supp. (1971) (Commission of Inquiry report on Greece);
46 Off. Bull., Supp. 11 (1963) (Commission of Inquiry report on Liberia); 45 Off. Bull., Supp.
11 (1962) (Commission of Inquiry report on Portugal). See generally N. VALTICOS, supra
note 12, at 245-47; Landy, supra note 12, at 649-51.
38. See 223 G.B. Min. V/6 (1983) (appointment of members of Commission of Inquiry).
See also id. at IV/10 (preliminary decision to establish Commission of Inquiry). Until the
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of the ILO to refuse to cooperate at all with a Commission of Inquiry3 e
and even threatened to withdraw from the ILO in response to the Com-
mission's establishment.4 0
2. Freedom of Association Machinery
In addition to ordinary supervisory procedures which apply to any
convention, the ILO encourages implementation of the freedom of associ-
ation conventions through adjudicatory mechanisms unique to those in-
struments. The primary body responsible for receiving complaints is the
tripartite Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association
("CFA").4 ' Because of the importance of the principles of freedom of as-
sociation to the ILO's Constitutional aims and purposes, 42 governments
and workers' and employers' organizations may present a complaint
against a member state whether or not that state has ratified the freedom
of association conventions. 43 The freedom of association machinery also
includes a Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission4 4 composed of in-
Governing Body's action, the article 26 complaint had been considered in the Committee on
Freedom of Association together with Case No. 1097 concerning Poland. See infra notes 61-
63.
39. See 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. 123 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report on
Poland). Member states are obliged to "place at the disposal of the Commission all the
information in their possession which bears upon the subject-matter of the complaint." ILO
CONST. art. 27.
40. See supra text accompanying note 2.
41. See 117 G.B. Min. 88 (1951) (establishing CFA procedures). See generally E. HAAS,
supra note 31, at 383-423; E. HAAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL AcrON (1970); N.
VALTIcOs, supra note 12, at 249-50; Landy, supra note 12, at 654-55.
42. See ILO CONST. preamble para. 2 & annex art. I, para. b. See generally 57 Off. Bull.
152 (1974) (resolution on freedom of association and industrial relations in Europe).
43. See W. GALENSON, supra note 16, at 206; E. HAAS, supra note 31, at 381; N. VAL-
TICOS, supra note 12, at 248; Landy, supra note 12, at 640, 653-54. Complaints are presented
to the CFA primarily by trade union organizations. See N. VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 248;
Landy, supra note 12, at 654. The CFA's reports are transmitted to the Governing Body,
which ordinarily approves them. See N. VALTIcos, supra note 12, at 249. The Soviet Union
and other bloc states have questioned the CFA's objectivity. See, e.g., 139 G.B. Min. 27
(1958) (statement by USSR government delegate). See also S. IVANOV, supra note 23, at
230-36 (criticisms of composition and work of CFA); V. SHKUNAEV, supra note 16, at 95
(CFA as instrument of cold war and political propaganda against socialist countries); V.
VLADIMmOV, supra note 16, at 65, 89; Letter to Francis Blanchard, supra note 16 (declara-
tion of socialist countries noting that "[rlepresentatives of socialist countries are not admit-
ted to such important bodies of the so-called ILO supervisory machinery as, for example,
the Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association"). Cf. supra note 32 (bloc states
question impartiality of COE). Partially as a result of the ILO's consideration of the Polish
labor situation, the bloc states have recently renewed their efforts to modify the supervisory
machinery. See, e.g., 69 Rec. Proc. 7/17-7/19 (1983) (statement by government delegate from
German Democratic Republic calling for working group to examine supervisory machinery);
Letter to Francis Blanchard, supra note 16 (declaration of socialist countries arguing that
"[tihere is a striking contrast between approaches towards representations and complaints
lodged against socialist States and those concerning imperalist States"). But cf. S. IVANOV,
supra note 23, at 218-20 (necessity for strengthening ordinary supervisory apparatus).
44. See E.S.C. Res. 277, 10 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 9 (1950) (approving estab-
lishment of Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission). See generally N. VALTicos, supra
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dependent experts to which complaints may be referred only with the
consent of the government concerned. The Commission was originally in-
tended to be the primary body in the freedom of association machinery.
In actuality, however, few cases have been considered through this route.
The CFA, which at first was intended as a body for conducting prelimi-
nary investigations, consequently has emerged as the principal organ in
the freedom of association machinery for publicizing violations of trade
union rights.4
5
Cases in the CFA have demonstrated that Poland has persistently
failed to observe the principles embodied in the freedom of association
conventions. Poland has been the subject of four complaints lodged with
the CFA, each of which has resulted in adverse findings.
The first complaint against Poland"s was presented to the CFA in
1953.'1 The CFA examined Poland's trade union scheme48 and noted that
trade unions were required by the constitution and rules of the Central
Council of Trade Unions to recognize the guiding role of the Polish
United Workers' Party ("PUWP"), Poland's Communist Party. The CFA
suggested that the registration requirement, the necessity for recognition
of the guiding role of the PUWP by registered unions, and the imposition
of trade union unity were inconsistent with the right of workers to estab-
lish and join organizations of their own choosing without previous author-
ization.' The second case51 was commenced in 1956 as a result of a strike
and demonstration in Poznan. After noting that strikes, although not ille-
gal, were officially discouraged and disapproved in Poland, the CFA em-
phasized that the right to strike and the right to demonstrate peacefully
in support of occupational demands were critical rights of workers and
workers' organizations. 1
In 1978 another complaint" was presented to the CFA alleging that
Poland's trade union legislation still did not meet the standards of No.
87. In mid-1980, however, the Polish government concluded historic
agreements" with striking workers providing in part for the full imple-
note 12, at 250-52; Landy, supra note 12, at 656-57.
45. See E. HAAs, supra note 31, at 383; W. GALENSON, supra note 16, at 207; Landy,
supra note 12, at 656. See generally A. ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 260-69 (establishment of
freedom of association machinery by ILO in consultation with UN); S. IVANOV, supra note
23, at 222-30 (same).
46. CFA Cae N. .58 (Poland).
47. Nos. 87 and 98 did not enter into force for Poland until February 25, 1958. 264
U.N.T.S. 332, 348. But see supra text accompanying note 43 (complaints against ILO mem-
ber states may be presented to CFA regardless of ratification of Nos. 87 and 98).
48. See supra text accompanying note 33.
49. 39 Off. Bull. 191-93 (1956) (CFA Case No. 58).
50. CFA Case No. 148 (Poland).
51. 39 Off. Bull. 207-09 (1956) (CFA Case No. 148). See generally E. HAAs, supra note
31, at 386-87 (analyzing CFA Cases Nos. 58 and 148).
52. CFA Case No. 909 (Poland).
53. The first agreement, which included a provision specifying implementation of No.
87, was concluded in Szczecin on August 30, 1980. Glos Pracy, Sept. 2, 1980, at 2, col. 4;
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mentation of Nos. 87 and 98. The government also agreed to alter the
registration requirement and to guarantee the right to strike. In October
the Polish parliament (Sejm) adopted an amendment" to the Trade
Union Act of 1949 permitting registration with the Warsaw provincial
court instead of the Central Council of Trade Unions. That court, how-
ever, modified the charter of the confederation of independent trade un-
ions Solidarity (Solidarnosc) by inserting a reference to the leading role
of the PUWP and altering the provisions dealing with strikes."5 On ap-
peal the Polish Supreme Court concluded that the lower court had ex-
ceeded its power in modifying Solidarity's charter. The Supreme Court
then approved without alteration a version of the charter submitted by
the union which included the principal provisions of Nos. 87 and 98 as an
annex.5s As a result of these developments, the CFA concluded in Novem-
ber 1980 that the complaint had "lost its basis.""7
Zycie Warszawy, Sept. 2, 1980, at 2, col. 1, translated in N. ASCHMESON, supra note 6, at 284;
AUGUST 1980, supra note 8, at 416. The second, which provided in addition for implementa-
tion of No. 98, was concluded in Gdansk on August 31, 1980. Glos Pracy, Sept. 2, 1980, at 2,
col. 1; Zycie Warszawy, Sept. 2, 1980, at 2, col. 1, translated in N. AscHERSON, supra note 6,
at 288; AUGUST 1980, supra note 8, at 423; KARATNYCKY, ET AL., supra note 8, at 123; D.
MACSHANE, supra note 6, at 151 [hereinafter cited as Gdansk Agreement]. In the Gdansk
Agreement the government consented to "the establishment of new, independent and self-
governing trade unions" that would not be under the control of the state or the PUWP. The
new unions "[r]ecogniz[ed] that the PUWP plays the leading role in the state" and stated
further that they did not intend to be a political party, would observe the Polish constitu-
tion, would not attempt to disrupt Poland's international alliances, and approved of the
principle of social ownership of the means of production. The Polish government subse-
quently extended the Gdansk Agreement to the entire country. See TouRaMN, Er AL., supra
note 6, at 197; L. WESCHLER, supra note 6, at 176; de Weydenthal, supra note 5, at 12. A
third agreement was concluded in Jastrzebie on September 3. See N. ASCHERSON, supra note
6, at 177.
54. 1980 Dziennik Ustaw 241 (Pol.), translated in 1980 ILO LEGIS. SER. 34 (Supp.). The
government stated that the amendment was designed to allow registration of the new inde-
pendent unions, as specified in the Gdansk Agreement, with a body other than the Central
Council of Trade Unions. The government also communicated to the ILO that it was under-
taking to draft new trade union legislation consistent with Poland's international obliga-
tions. See 63 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 3, at 101-04 (CFA Case No. 909).
55. See PRAWO I ZyciE, Nov. 23, 1980, at 12 (report on hearing in Supreme Court
describing actions taken by provincial court) (English summary and text of charter submit-
ted by Solidarity to provincial court on file with Denver Journal of International Law and
Policy).
56. See id. (reporting text of judgment) (translation on file with Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy). The Supreme Court's decision is thought to represent a
behind-the-scenes compromise between the government and Solidarity. See generally N.
ASCHERSON, supra note 6, at 195-99; de Weydenthal, supra note 5, at 17-19; Court Backs
Union in Poland's Dispute over Role of Party, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1980, at Al, col. 5. The
reference to the leading role of the PUWP was relegated to an annex quoting portions of the
Gdansk Agreement. See de Weydenthal, supra note 5, at 18-19.
57. 63 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 3, at 108 (1980) (CFA Case No. 909). The COE's next
report noted the statutory amendment "with satisfaction." 1981 COE Rep. 121. In connec-
tion with Case No. 909, Poland received the first "direct contact" mission ever accepted by a
Soviet bloc state. See 63 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 3, at 98 (1980) (CFA Case No. 909); ILO
Press Release (Nov. 27, 1981). See generally N. VALTicos, supra note 12, at 242-43; Landy,
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In December 1981 the Polish Council of State adopted a martial law
decree and resolution s that curtailed all trade union activity and prohib-
ited strikes. Two new complaints"9 were immediately presented to the
CFA alleging that the arrest and detention of trade unionists and the pro-
hibition of trade union activity as a result of the declaration of martial
law violated Nos. 87 and 98, the 1980 agreements, and the charters of the
independent unions. The CFA found that the internment of trade union
activists and the suppression of trade union functions were inconsistent
with the principles of freedom of association. 0 In October 1982 the Sejm
adopted new trade union legislation" that purported to guarantee the in-
dependence of self-governing trade unions. The CFA found numerous de-
fects in the law, among which were the dissolution of all existing trade
unions, restrictions on the right to strike, and a statutory timetable
prohibiting resumption of trade union activity before specified dates."2 At
the CFA's recommendation," the Governing Body referred this case and
the article 26 complaint filed by delegates to the 1982 Conference to a
Commission of Inquiry."
In the conclusions to its report,6 5 the Commission noted that the Po-
supra note 12, at 646-47. Lech Walesa, President of the National Committee of Solidarity,
was the Polish workers' delegate to the 1981 Conference. See 67 Rec. Proc. 10/9-10/10
(1981), reprinted in D. MAcSHAx, supra note 6, at 160 (Walesa's address to Conference).
58. 1981 Dziennik Ustaw 309, 317 (Pol.), translated in JPRS E. EUR. REP., Feb. 26,
1982, at 21. Martial law was suspended by the Council of State's resolution of December 19,
1982. 1982 Dziennik Ustaw 737 (Pol.) (translation on file with Denver Journal of Interna-
tional Law and Policy). See also id. at 730 (law on special legal regulations during the
suspension of martial law) (translation on file with Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy), The Council of State lifted martial law by its resolution of July 20, 1983. 1983
Dziennik Ustaw 536 (Pol.) (translation on file with Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy).
59. CFA Case No. 1097 (Poland).
60. 65 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 1, at 186-87 (1982) (CFA Case No. 1097). The COE's next
report contained similar observations. 1982 COE Rep. 125-26. Poland sent a delegation to
the 1982 Conference consisting only of government representatives. Nongovernmental dele-
gates must be "chosen in agreement with the industrial organisations, if such organisations
exist, which are most representative of employers or workpeople, as the case may be, in their
respective countries." ILO CONST. art. 3, para. 5. See also id. art. 3, para. 9 (Conference may
exclude delegates not nominated in accordance with this principle). Because of this require-
ment, the Polish government probably anticipated a credentials challenge if a workers' dele-
gate other than from Solidarity were part of the Polish delegation.
61 1.9 lR iefflnik Ust-w 581 (Pol.), translated in 1982 ILO LEGIS. SER. The Polish
government submitted a draft of the legislation to the ILO for review three days before
enactment. Although the government made some changes based on the ILO's comments, it
did not alter the basic provisions of the legislation. See 65 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 3, at 288-
89, 298-99 (1982) (CFA Case No. 1097).
62. 65 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 3, at 299-301 (1982) (CFA Case No. 1097). The COE's next
report also noted inconsistencies between the new trade union legislation and Nos. 87 and
98. 1983 COE Rep. 147-48, 181.
63. 66 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 2, at 144 (1983) (CFA Case No. 1097).
64. See supra note 38. Poland boycotted the 1983, 1984, and 1985 Conferences.
65. 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. 120-46 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report on
Poland).
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lish government had not appeared before it and had totally failed to co-
operate with the Commission's investigation. In particular, the govern-
ment had refused to permit members of the Commission to visit Poland
to communicate firsthand with those involved in the controversy and did
not allow witnesses in Poland to leave the country to testify before the
Commission in Geneva. The Commission nonetheless concluded that, be-
cause of Poland's voluntary ratification of the ILO's Constitution and the
freedom of association conventions, the Commission's examination of the
complaint did not constitute interference in Poland's internal affairs. The
Commission also rejected the assertion that the complaint's allegedly po-
litical character affected its validity. 6
On the merits of the complaint, the Commission concluded that the
situation in Poland before the declaration of martial law was not so grave
as to justify subsequent nonobservance of the freedom of association con-
ventions. The suspension of trade union activity by the declaration of
martial law and the subsequent dissolution of all existing trade unions by
the new trade union legislation consequently were violations of No. 87.
The Commission found that the prohibition on strikes and the intern-
ment and detention of trade union leaders because of their trade union
activities likewise conflicted with the guarantees of No. 87. The Commis-
sion also considered the evidence to demonstrate that after the declara-
tion of martial law many members of independent unions suffered antiu-
nion discrimination in violation of No. 98.
After reviewing Poland's new trade union legislation, the Commission
found that a transitional prohibition on more than one trade union organ-
ization in an enterprise conflicted with No. 87, which anticipates trade
union plurality. The Commission observed that a requirement for ap-
proval of a strike by a majority of a union's members, as distinct from a
majority of its voting members, was an unreasonable restriction on the
right of trade unions to organize their activities. Restrictions on the es-
tablishment of federations and confederations were also criticized by the
Commission as violations of No. 87.67
66. See supra text accompanying note 2.
67. The Commission also noted that a requirement in the legislation that trade unions
be organized by occupation was acceptable to the extent that those unions could form re-
gional associations. See 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. 142 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry
report on Poland). See also id. at 143-44 (right to establish federations and confederations
guaranteed by No. 87 must be applied to permit regional associations). This had been a
particularly troublesome issue for the government because Solidarity, unlike the official
trade unions, had adopted a regional structure. The government often asserted that this was
evidence of Solidarity's intent to become not a trade union, but a political organization. See,
e.g., 65 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 2, at 155-56, 174 (1982) (CFA Case No. 1097); N. AsCHERSON,
supra note 6, at 178-79. Cf. S. IvANov, supra note 23, at 29-31 (interpreting No. 87 as pro-
tecting political activity by trade unions). Interestingly, the Commission of Inquiry found
that a provision in the new trade union legislation requiring reference in a trade union's
charter to the leading role of the PUWP in society was not of itself a violation of No. 87.
See 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. 142-43 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report on Po-
land). Cf. 1985 COE Rep. 182-83 (criticism of statutory timetable for resumption of trade
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IV. Conclusion
In its recommendations, s" the Commission of Inquiry stated its belief
that freedom of association could exist in Poland without disruption of
fundamental principles on which the Polish state is based. Before the
declaration of martial law, the Polish government had produced draft
trade union legislation that the ILO approved as basically consistent with
the freedom of association conventions.69 Even after the declaration of
martial law, the Polish government admitted that there was room in its
socioeconomic system for self-managed and truly independent unions.70
This assertion is not contrary to Lenin's statements on trade unions.
Even more importantly, this attitude on the part of the government is
required by the universal principles of trade union freedom to which Po-
land has voluntarily adhered. Instead of withdrawing from the ILO, the
Polish government might more profitably invest its effort in working with
the Organization once again to begin to establish a trade union environ-
ment consistent with fundamental principles of freedom of association.7 1
union activcity and conditions on right to strike).
68. 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. 148 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report on
Poland).
69. See 64 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 2, at 3 (1981) (CFA Case No. 909).
70. See 65 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 1, at 181 (1982) (CFA Case No. 1097).
71. Even if Poland withdraws from the iLO, it will still be buound by the obligatiors
assumed under Nos. 87 and 98. See supra note 1. In cases of persistent inability to observe a
convention, denunciation is a potential last resort. See E. LANDY, supra note 30, at 97 (De-
nunciation "is a solution of despair[,] .. . [y]et it may be precisely in the interest of the rule
of law to put an end to obligations when efforts to observe them encounter fundamental
obstacles and when there apparently exists no hope for gradual compliance."); Landy, supra
note 12, at 648. Cf. Note, The Polish Labor Crisis of 1980: An Assessment of the Role of the
International Labor Organization, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 177, 203 & n.163 (1982) (sug-
gesting that implementation of freedom of association conventions in Poland could be facili-
tated by ratification of Convention No. 144 Concerning Tripartite Consultations to Promote
the Implementation of International Labour Standards).
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